Introduction
2022 was a brutal year for blockchain-related investments. Many striking events shook the faith of enthusiasts and believers in this “new technology” and its promise of trustworthiness and left investors licking their wounds: The collapse of stablecoins and other crypto tokens, the bankruptcy of publicly traded crypto mining companies, the market sell-off and, of course, the fall of the FTX empire – the first proper crypto credit crisis. In front of an investment market built around the blockchain that has lost a little over $2 trillion in 20221, singing the hymn of praise for Distributed Ledger Technologies – in conservative business segments like real estate in particular – truly becomes a hard work to achieve.
Financial analysts blame the fall in blockchain-based businesses on the same fundamental shift in global economic conditions that have strained other speculative segments of financial markets, such as big tech. Soaring inflation has forced central banks around the world to tighten monetary policy, which in turn brought an end to the tide of easy money. But macroeconomics should not detract one from the fact that, more likely, internal factors cause companies to fail. Good governance has always been key for businesses to succeed. In times of hype it becomes a valuable asset. Add all sustainability and ESG-related requirements to it; good governance tops all crucial non-financial investment criteria.
This article undertakes a short analysis2 of the probable reasons that lead blockchain companies like FTX to fail. It highlights the role of governance in corporate management. It sheds light on the possible beneficial role of blockchain in sustaining a sound corporate environment and good governance. It finally makes a case for “Smart Roles” in enhancing trust in business using the example of real estate.
Roland H. FARHAT
Chair FIBREE Frankfurt
The market’s collapse
The crash of a stablecoin in May 2022 marked the start of a chain of collapses that brought down several lending platforms, a hedge fund, a leading crypto asset exchange, and a large US-listed crypto mining company in 2022. In January 2023 another crypto asset exchange filed for creditor protection; and in March an American crypto bank ceased its operations. Of all and so far, the filing for bankruptcy protection in the US by the cryptocurrency group FTX has rocked the world of blockchain companies.
FTX grew to become the second-largest cryptocurrency exchange in the world, an empire worth $ 32 billion. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) alleged in a civil complaint that its founder had “orchestrated a years-long fraud” that concealed from investors the diversion of customer funds from FTX to his privately held crypto research hedge fund. In November 2022, concerns about FTX’s financial health and its balance sheet arose. On December 11, 2022 FTX filed for bankruptcy protection.
So, what do we know so far about the reasons?
First, FTX had a complex organisation, with no internal rules and regulation. It was run by a small cadre of executives out of a conjointly shared house in the Bahamas, and ultimately controlled by its founder, Sam Bankman-Fried. Contrary to all blockchain principles, FTX was operated as a centralised platform which additionally was based offshore. It became one of the major exchanges and was closely affiliated with a market maker. Its failure was rooted in a lack of transparency and conflicts of interest. Belonging to one involved Congressman, FTX failure appears to be “the same old-school fraud, just using a new technology”3.
Second, weak accounting practices left a shortage of liquidity to grow unnoticed. The FTX empire included $ 5.2 billion of illiquid venture capital investments. Bankman-Fried blamed mistaken accounting for its collapse. FTX newly appointed chief executive John Ray stated before the Congress that FTX collapsed because of the “absolute concentration of control in the hand of a small group of grossly inexperienced, not-sophisticated individuals”4.
Third, FTX lacked internal controls. The tipping point isn’t FTX per se, it’s the credit risk that its hedge fund was taking. Its founder planned to tell Congress how “internal failures” led the company to unravel. FTX unjustifiably lacked clear rules of separation of functions. Bankman-Fried claimed that FTX did not have a risk management team. He also blamed various failures on FTX’s internal controls5. FTX failed to implement virtually any of the control systems that are necessary for a company entrusted with other people’s money or assets6.
Fourth, FTX lacked an effective audit. FTX’s claims to have audited financial results left numerous questions unanswered, particularly in light of revelations about the complexity of its organisational structure7. It is, therefore, hard to understand how FTX 2021 financial results were audited, given the lack of documentation and the “paperless” character of its bankruptcy8.
All public testimonies stated so far that FTX bankruptcy was unusual in the sense that there was literally no recordkeeping or any other kind of documented evidence. It is unprecedented in terms of lack of documentation. John Ray, the appointed CEO of FTX, testified that the business was an “old-fashioned embezzlement: you take money from customers and use it for your own purposes”9.
Search for good governance
Reflecting on the FTX case, it quickly becomes apparent where the real pain points can be found. There is much evidence which suggests that the causes of the FTX's bankruptcy lie in the lack of orderly management and compliance rules: an overly complex organisational structure, acting in a risky setting, was relying on business processes and systems that were not subject to any internal definitions, regulations or controls. Good governance, as defined and regulated in all currently applicable laws - including ESG regulations, was completely lacking.
The blockchain industry, since its very beginning, has been confronted with scepticism relating to its anticipated vulnerability to serious criminal conduct. Critics focused on issues around anti money laundering. But pertaining to the year 2022, it might be worth mentioning that many of the failures that occurred reflect inadequate corporate governance structures. And it might be worthy of mention that in the case of FTX, it was because transactions were partly logged on the blockchain that they could be found fraudulent (a fact remaining to be proven).
Once again, regulators are feeling the heat of the market and struggling to respond in a coordinated and effective way. Once again, regulation bodies fail to keep up with the sector’s pace of change. What is new this time around is that regulators are seeing themselves confronted with large-scale corporate failures. One of the latest regulations to take on governance issues is the EU’s Markets in Crypto Assets (MiCA) regulation, which agreed text was given final approval by the European Parliament on April 20, 2023. By regulating the main activities related to crypto assets, the tailored crypto asset regime shall ensure a high level of consumer and investor protection and market integrity10. The proposed regulation is also expected to reduce the level of fraud related to crypto assets by imposing requirements to governance (e.g. prevention of money laundering) or operational aspects (e.g. establishment of common rules on supervision and customer protection) on the companies involved. MiCA will cover crypto-assets that are not regulated by existing financial services legislation11.
What’s more, the European Commission started an initiative12 to improve the EU regulatory framework on company law and corporate governance. It would help companies (blockchain-based ones included) focus on long-term sustainable value creation rather than short-term benefits. It aims to better align the interests of companies, shareholders, stakeholders and society.
As FIBREE stressed in past Industry Reports13, in the “ESG” world, the most problematic of the three components is G, Governance, for it is not an outcome in itself but rather an ongoing procedure. Risks emanating from a lack of leadership can cause ambiguous chains of command and execution processes.
Introducing “Smart Roles”
Researchers and developers unanimously praise blockchain for enhancing trust in business. But after the inglorious legacy of 2022 one fundamental issue surged: Can a blockchain-based business itself be trusted at all? A look in research papers shows – at an interval of one year – a changing look at blockchain standards from within the industry. In 2022, non-public and permissioned networks were praised as a solution for avoiding fraudulent memberships for risk-averse companies14. In 2023 organisations were taught to cement their credibility by helping reinvent public blockchains15.
Let's get back to basics. The idea behind a blockchain is bigger than having distributed ledgers which can be used to register transactions.
The underlying concept of blockchain is that:
- it can not only replace middlemen but rather intermediate steps of whole processes
- it is not only about recording transactions but rather saving proofs of evidence
- it can not only establish trust between business partners through immutable records of transactions but rather through strengthening reliability in processes
- it ultimately not only enhances the effectiveness but also the performance of the business – most notably if the blockchain is complemented by other new technologies like Artificial Intelligence, AI.
A blockchain-based business works better the better the underlying processes and actions are reflected on the blockchain. One crucial lesson learned from 2022 is that a blockchain-based business is first and foremost, a business. Like in every business, companies need a clear and assured corporate governance. If governance lacks, weakens, or fails, the underlying blockchain will perform poorly. The better governance issues are determined in a company’s mission and vision, its culture and internal frameworks, the more reliable its governance issues get on the blockchain. This notion applies to the stakeholder-crowded and process-rich real estate business.
As mentioned above, failures which occurred in 2022 were due to management deficiencies. Therefore, rebuilding trust requires a consequent handling of good governance and compliance issues. A solution could be at hand: The development of a business transaction and the underlying decision-making process within an enterprise can themselves be brought to the blockchain. All involved stakeholders can, in this case, check the authenticity, correctness and integrity of an action by tracing its origination. One of the blockchain-based trust use cases, tracking provenance, which covers supply chains (e.g. to verify their adherence to ESG-rules) can be extended to internal enterprise processes. Similar to “smart contracts”, which are used between external partners, “Smart Roles” can be implemented within an enterprise. As part of the enterprise architecture, “smart roles” become verification gates of business actions. A step in the decision-making process can then only be concluded, if and when the manager in charge attests its compliance with the book of rules. A separation between chains of command – that is between the “Do” line and the “Check” line – can materialise, personal responsibility and liability become the drivers of management choices and a conflict of interest is adequately addressed. All details immutably recorded.
Smart Roles within a blockchain-based real estate enterprise as means to prove good governance
All use cases in the real estate business, where blockchain can be put to work, share on the risk side the intrinsic need to comply with regulations, and avoid costly wrong-doings. The chart shows how smart roles can be mapped within the enterprise landscape and assigned to different decision-independent parties in the real estate business.
Conclusion
Extending the blockchain use case of provenance tracking for product origins to tracking steps in the decision-making not only helps supply chains but chains of command within a company become more transparent and reliable.
The post-FTX era will surely be shaped by due diligence, compliance, custody, and security. The real estate business has always benefited from good governance rules and compliance to regulation. Today, there exist several instruments to establish good governance structures and monitor execution. A blockchain based structure can help real estate businesses master governance issues in the - strongly ESG influenced - investment environment.
“Fraudsters always seem to steal the headlines. But elsewhere in the blockchain space, great things are happening” stands big as a quote in an advertisement16. Today, with the concept of “Smart Roles” and other new developments, there exists a sustained case that blockchain won’t be seen any more as a solution for a problem that doesn’t exist but will rather be perceived as a serious and plausible means to build good governance.
1 DeVon, Cheyenne (2022). “Bitcoin lost over 60% of its value in 2022”. [0nline] CNBC. Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/23/bitcoin-lost-over-60-percent-of-its-value-in-2022.html. [Accessed April 18, 2023].
2 This article is based on a self-conducted research of publicly known information about failed blockchain companies in 2022 as of March 2023. Because of its former role and weight in the market, it mainly focuses on the collapse of FTX.
3 Patrick McHenry, Ranking Member of the American House Financial Services Committee (2022). “The Biggest Revelations From the Testimony Sam Bankman-Fried Never Gave”. [Online] TIME Magazine, video. Available at: https://time.com/6240765/sam-bankman-fried-ftx-biggest-revelations/. [Accessed April 20, 2023].
4 John Ray III, Testimony before the American House Financial Services Committee (2022). “The Biggest Revelations From the Testimony Sam Bankman-Fried Never Gave”. [Online] TIME Magazine, video. Available at: https://time.com/6240765/sam-bankman-fried-ftx-biggest-revelations/. [Accessed April 20, 2023].
5 Sam Bankman-Fried (2022). “Exclusive Transcript: The Full Testimony Bankman-Fried Planned To Give To Congress”. [Online] Forbes. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenehrlich/2022/12/13/exclusive-transcript-the-full-testimony-sbf-planned-to-give-to-congress/. [Accessed April 21, 2023].
6 Refer to John Ray III, Testimony before the American House Financial Services Committee (2022).
7 Stephen Foley (2022). Citing Professor Jeffrey Johanns from the University of Texas at Austin. “FTX collapse puts focus on digital audit groups”. Financial Times, November 14, 2022, page 6.
8 Refer to John Ray III, Testimony before the American House Financial Services Committee (2022).
9 Refer to John Ray III, Testimony before the American House Financial Services Committee (2022).
10 European Commission (2020-2023). “Proposal for the Regulation of The European Parliament and of The Council on Markets in Crypto-assets, and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937”. [Online] EU. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020PC0593&qid=1684171438186. [Accessed May 12, 2023].
11 European Parliament (2023). “Crypto-assets: green light to new rules for tracing transfers in the EU”. [Online] EU. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20230414IPR80133/crypto-assets-green-light-to-new-rules-for-tracing-transfers-in-the-eu. [Accessed May 12, 2023].
12 European Commission (2022). “Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937”. [Online] EU. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12548-Sustainable-corporate-governance_en. [accessed May 12, 2023].
13 Roland H. Farhat, (2022). “Put Your Money Where Your Impact Is -- and Have No Doubt About It with a Distributed Ledger Technology”. [Online] FIBREE. Available at: www.fibree.org. [Accessed May 12, 2023]. Companies would be reluctant to disclose sensitive data of their own organisation, particularly if the metrics were to show a “bad” governance. Main Governance risks include racial and social inequality, and lack of leadership within the company.
14 Wendy Henry and Linda Pawczuk (2021). “Blockchain: Ready for business”. [Online] Deloitte. Available at: https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/focus/tech-trends.html?id=us:2pm:3ad:firmfy23:awa:greendot:em:tech:cn:tt23:260x60:qz:040523:1088863358#in-us-we-trust. [Accessed May 12, 2023].
15 Mike Bechtel and Bill Briggs (2022). “Tech Trends 2023”. [Online] Deloitte. Available at: https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/focus/tech-trends.html?id=us:2pm:3ad:firmfy23:awa:greendot:em:tech:cn:tt23:260x60:qz:040523:1088863358#in-us-we-trust. [Accessed May 12, 2023].
16 Stellar Development Foundation (2023). “Blockchain fastest Humanitarian Aid” [Advertisement]. Financial Times, January 17, 2023, page 7.